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The Helms hearing about a constitutional amendment concerning
human life, held in the summer of 1982, may not have created much
interest (or heat), but it created some important light. It is also strange
and disturbing that its basic thrust was not widely commented o n.
It was disturbing because the "pro-choiCe" people have now shifted
the basis of the abortion argument to exactly the place it should have
been from the beginning : the nature of the abortus.
Witnesses for the bill- geneticists, embryologists, etc. -offered
testimony of an overwhelming nature, which led to only one conclusion: apart from conception, there is no plausible moment of t he
.
beginning of the human individual.
Incredibly, the opponents of the constitutional amendment sid estepped this momentous issue and said that what really mattered was
not whether the unborn was a human being, but whether it was a
human being valuable enough to protect. This sudden shift from a
question of fact to one of value has not seen such argumentation since
the case of Dread Scott v. Sanford (1857).
For years (at least, since 1973) , the whole movement to repeal t he
abortion decisions (one hesitates to call them "laws" since they were
simply " discoveries" by the Court where none had seen them before)
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has been opposed by vociferous and explicit denials of this central and
crucial fact, namely, that the unborns are humans-in-being. The
unborn were, said the pro-choice people, "products of conception,"
"protoplasm," "alpha," "cells," etc. All of a sudden, the locus of the
argument has changed and the question of fact conceded: "Yes, of
course, the unborn are humans-in-being, but the 14th Amendment
protects only persons (a legal concept}, and this status is given only to
those we want or value."
This was essentially the argument of the New York Court of
Appeals in Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospital Corp. (1972), a
case challenging the liberal abortion laws of New York. Of course, said
the court, the unborn are human -that is granted. The real issue,
however, is whom does the law protect, for it is the law which says
who are protectable persons, and who are not.
This judicial positivism at the time of Byrn was honest and refreshing because, as they say, courts are not in the business of making laws
but interpreting laws. It was for the legislature, limited by the Constitution, to determine who is a legal person, said the New York Court of
Appeals. Since the New York legislature had declared that the unborn
were not legal persons, at least for the first 24 weeks, they had no
protection under the laws and could be killed at will. This simplistic
and positivist view of the relationship between legality and morality
has the advantage of being simple and morally painless. It is also
irrelevant to the issue, which was : are the un!Jorn humans-in-being?
Now, for the first time in a national forum, the " pro-choice" people
have conceded, like the New York Court of Appeals, that the unborn
are human beings, although because they are unwanted, t.hey are without rights. In other words, the rights of the unborn are dependent, not
upon the inherent fact of their being human, but upon value or
Wantedness. This is legal positivism, but it is, at least, clear and forthright. The Helms hearing brought out and settled this major point of
the abortion debate of the past 10 years: the humanity of the unborn
had never been a point of real importance to the pro-choice people; it
had only been an arguing point all along. It is at least refreshing to
clear the air and have the basic issues faced once and for all. It
reminds one of the editorial in California Medicine, more than a
decade ago (1970), which forthrightly said:
[T] he result has been a curious avoidance of the scientific fact , which
every one really knows , that human life begins at conception and is contin·
uous whether intra or extrauterine until death . The very considerable
semantic gymnastics which are required to rationalize abortion as anything
but taking a human life would be ludicrous if it were not often put forth
under socially impeccable auspices .

This same argument is not new in constitutional law or jurisPrudence; it is at least as old as Dred Scott (1857), and probably much
older.
May,1984
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The question was looked at in Roe u. Wade (1973) and resolved
the negative : Does the 14th Amendment protect the unborn? Was
the intent of the framers of that amendment ~o include _the unbo~
The Supreme Court, in a rather sloppy histoncal analysis, concluo
that it was not.
On the contrary, the argument of the framers _was broad enough
encompass the unborn within its sweep, precisely because of t
nature of that historical argument surrounding the birth of the 14
Amendment. How was this so?
The lawyers in 1866 who drafted the bill knew _well the ar~m f.
of Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott. It was precisely that. thmk1
and reasoning about human beings which the l~wy~rs of the blll had
overcome, once and for all, in and by a constltutwnal amendment
Dred Scott was to be effectively overturned.
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Taney Denied Protection
It will be remembered that Chief Justice Taney was. de~ermined. to
deny blacks every possible protection under the Constltutwn be~a se
that was the only way to uphold the system of slavery. Every desig ,ation of humanity had to be eliminated , bec~use th~t -~auld have bt en
fatal to his argument. Taney was not a juridical positlVlst. Th~ Ro ~ an
law had clearly seen that even slaves were personal humans-m-be1 1g.
The Roman jurists simply said that the law excluded these p~rsc ns
from its protection. Taney had no such simplicity because the histt ry
of the common law, under Christian influence, held clearly t hat
every human-in-being was a person, protectable by and through 1 he
law Therefore Taney had to desperately exclude blacks from l he
notion of persons: he had to deny their humanity. Thus, through 00
pages of tightly reasoned historical analysis, blacks were never called
"people" or "human" or " men" or "citizens." Taney al':"ays called
them simply "a degraded race," "a subordinate and infenor class of
beings," who possessed no power or rights ~e~o?d wha~ _t~e whlt e
man chose to give them. But the beginnings of JUridiCal posi~Ivism were .
also present: Taney held that the framers of the Constitutwn had no
intention of including slaves as citizens.
When the drafters of the 14th Amendme~t set o~t to compose tha!
document it was this reasoning which had to be ehmmated from th
Constituti~n once and for all. For this purpose, they sought the
clearest word, undimmable by quibble, with whic~ to secure foreve~
the rights each of us should enjoy under a shelten~g ~~w · T?e w o~
they chose was "person," which, from the most pnm1~1ve h_Ist~,ry ~~
Western thought and philosophy, only meant a "human m bemg (t d
persona in Roman law, which applied to all people, ~ven ~laves , a~d
the prosopon in Greek law). No person, no human-m-,~emg, w~ ~ or
ever again be considered a person because he or she was valuable
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not, much as the slave was valuable property to the slaveholder with
whom he, the slaveholder; could do as he pleased. Every human was a
person, protected by the amendment. Every person, every human-inbeing, had the equal protection of the laws which the states and the
federal government must protect via the 5th and 14th Amendments.
It is therefore illogical, unhistorical, and a complete denial of the
very intent of the framers to now come around and give that amendment an ex clusionary meaning by elimmating certain humans from the
equal protection of the laws- the very thing which its framers set out
to eliminate forever from the text of the Constitution.
In the abortion debat e, once again, unborn human beings (now, by
admission of the pro-choice people themselves) are denied the equal
protection of the laws, exactly as were the blacks in Dred Scott. But
the pro-choice strategy stumbled exactly along the course Chief Justice Taney had followed. The Constitution, said Taney, did not
bestow personhood on the black man, because that is not what the
founders had historically in mind. At the Helms hearings, the prochoice people argued in a similar way: although person would ordinarily include the unborn (just as the Declaration of Independence would
ordinarily include the black man, because he was human, said Taney),
since the unborn had never (since 1866) received the full benefit of
law, the amendment should not be read with them in mind. The
unborn, who are humans-in-being, are denied the equal protection of
the laws because they are not persons, not because they are humansin-being, but because they are unwanted.
The Helms hearings have therefore re-enacted the same argument
and debate concerning Dred Scott. If my historical analysis is correct
-and it is difficult to see how it is not - then the burden of proof is
Upon the pro-choice people to show , by clear evidence, or, at least, by
probability, that this was not the intent of the framers of the 14th
Amendment.
Change in the Question
The whole question has changed since 197 3 . A decade later, the
Pro-choice people concede the humanity of the unborn, but the issue
now is not their humanity, but their acceptability to their elders. It is
refreshing, at least, to finally be talking about the same thing, and not
arguing like passing armies in the night.
It is difficult to develop a solid jurisprudence of and for this new
·stance of the pro-choice people. Human rights, we may conclude from
their analysis, are not inherent in the human being, but are " conferred" by the people who might want them or not. The historical
roots of this jurisprudential doctrine of "wantedness " are not happy
ones, since, often in the past, many groups were at one time or
another, "not wanted."
May,1984
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More to the point, the logic of this philosophy is now t 1g
extended beyond birth to those who have already been born, but i ·n
defective. Since they, too, are not wanted, by reason of their phy al
or mental defect, such children are now commonly allowed to st ve
to death in a form of postnatal abortion. The logic of the juri~ udence of wantedness has been extended to yet another grou} o f
humans-in-being. Philosophy, like reality, cannot be hidden by we 1s.
In other words, it is difficult to escape the logic of the philosc (lY
of life which we espouse. Not only does the "wanted" philoso . Y
contradict the historical intent of the framers of the 14th Amendm nt,
but also, more importantly, in denying some the protection of t eir
humanity, the rights of the rest of us are jeopardized in a basic d
real sense. The issues here, as in Byrn and Roe, are the philosophy nd
foundation of human rights.
At bottom, the abortion debate is one of inherent human ri~ tts,
which are founded either in the nature of the human person or ir his
or her being wanted. There is no middle term between these wo
inherently contradictory philosophies. "Pro-choice" is a weasel " Jrd
which bypasses this essential question.

BOOK REVIEWS
Church Property, Church Finances,
and Church-Related Corporations
Bishop Adam J. Maida, D.D., J.C.L., J.D. and Nicholas P. Cafardi, J.D.
Catholic Health Association, St. Louis, Mo . 63134 , 1984, 339 pp.
Catholic h ealth facilities are prominent among the Church ministries which
face the growing challenge of survival. Many of the factors involved are presented
in a recent article in Hospital Progress entitled "Survival Strategies for Not-forProfit Hospitals" (Dec. , 1983, pp. 40-60). Another crucial factor, often underestimated, is the religious vocation shortage and hence , a steady decline in religious
personnel to staff Church apostolates. It should be of prime interest to all bishops,
priests, doctors, nurses and all who are involved in or benefit from Catholic health
services to search for an answer to this multi-faceted challenge . Solid grounds for
optimism will be found in this recently published book .
The first 11 chapters are devoted to a "Church Perspective " - a lucid explanation of the 57 canons of the new Code of Canon Law (in effect since Nov. 27,
1983) which make up Book Five of that code entitled "The Temporal Goods of
the Church." The n ext 19 chapters present possible solutions in applying canon
law concepts to civil law procedures in the administration of church property .
These suggested procedures are backed by the extensive scholarship and experi . ence of the authors both in canon law and in civil law . The authors provide a
Powerful incentive for reading and digesting the contents of this book :
The requirements of canon law explained in this handbook, and the suggested civil law forms they should take . . . if they are properly followed
. : . will allow the ministries .o f the Church to thrive and flourish and to
ensure that the hungry are fed , the naked clothed, the uneducated are
taught the truth, the sick are healed , and hope is held out to those in despair
(Preface, p . XIV).
Since canon law and civil law concepts are somewhat un familiar to the average
reader, the authors follow a consistent policy of repeating basic concepts and of
summarizing recommended procedures. This effective didactic ploy is enhanced
by a 30-page "Lexicon of Canonical and Legal Terms" at the end of the book .
This provides a handy · "key to comprehension . " Th e ir own transla t ion into
English of the 57 canons of Book Five of the Code of Canon Law is another plus
feature- "clarity incorporate'd . "
In a "Church Perspective" - chapters one through eleven , a canonical capsul e
on "The Temporal Goods of the Church" comes first. The Church is people. Th e
.effective pursuit of the spiritual mission of the Church , however, depends in large
Part upon the judicious administration of temporal goods. In view of this imperative, the Church rega rds the established units or agencie s in advancing th e mission
of the Church as public juridic persons (form erly known as " moral persons ").
They are called " juridic" because such entities are "creatures " or creations of the
law ("jus + dicit"). People, who make up the Church , are mortal. Public juridic
llersons continue on , and on , and on and hence can provide assurance that the
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